What America Has Lost in Its War on Iran: Israel, the Expanding Bill and the Electoral Reckoning (part 3/3)

By Elijah J. Magnier –

The divisions inside the United States lead to a more difficult question: how did a president elected on an “America First” platform become responsible for a war whose strategic direction was initially driven by Israel?

This final part examines the inversion at the centre of the US-Israel relationship. Israel helped initiate and shape the confrontation with Iran, yet gradually moved into the background as the conflict became a direct and increasingly costly struggle between Washington and Tehran. At the same time, it continued to resist American plans in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria, leaving the United States to carry the principal burden of a war while remaining unable, or unwilling, to control the ally that helped bring it about.

8. Israel began the war; America inherited it

8. Israel began the war; America inherited it

Israel was not a secondary participant in the confrontation. It was its principal driving force.

For years, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu argued that Iran’s nuclear programme, missile arsenal and regional alliances constituted an existential threat. He repeatedly called for military action and presented the destruction of Iran’s capabilities as essential to Israel’s survival.

Israel helped define the threat, shape the objectives and open the war. It encouraged Washington to believe that Iran could be struck, its leadership removed, its military power destroyed and its political system destabilised without producing an uncontrollable regional confrontation.

Yet the political ownership of the conflict has progressively shifted.

Israel remains militarily involved and continues to regard Iran as a strategic enemy. But Netanyahu no longer places Iran at the centre of his public political agenda as he did when preparing and launching the confrontation. He has increasingly concentrated on Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and his approaching election.

Israel is not directly involved in the negotiations intended to terminate the conflict. The decisive confrontation has become one between Washington and Tehran.

American forces now enforce the naval blockade, clear mines, protect shipping and confront Iran directly. Washington manages the diplomacy, absorbs the political backlash and carries the economic burden. Israel has moved towards the rear while the United States remains trapped at the front.

Meanwhile, Netanyahu continues to obstruct American diplomacy on other fronts.

In Gaza, Trump presented his initiatives as historic breakthroughs. Yet Israel continued striking after the ceasefire, restricted humanitarian assistance, maintained control over large areas and resisted moving towards withdrawal and reconstruction.

Netanyahu publicly rejected Trump’s revised 15-point plan, which linked Hamas’s disarmament to a gradual Israeli withdrawal and the deployment of an international stabilisation force. He declared that Israel would not withdraw before Hamas was fully disarmed and rejected any route towards Palestinian statehood.

The significance goes beyond a disagreement over sequencing. This was the Israeli prime minister rejecting the central diplomatic project of a president whose administration provides Israel with weapons, intelligence, diplomatic cover and strategic protection.

The same pattern is visible in Lebanon. Washington brokered ceasefires and negotiations, but Israel continued its air campaign, retained positions inside Lebanese territory and expanded its demands. American mediation has failed to transform cessation agreements into durable withdrawal.

In Syria, Washington lifted sanctions, developed relations with the new government and removed Syria from the list of state sponsors of terrorism to facilitate reconstruction and regional integration. Israel nevertheless continued its air attacks and territorial incursions, undermining the stability Washington claimed to support.

Israel has also treated Turkey, a NATO member and a country with which Trump maintains close relations, as a strategic rival. It has attacked Syrian military facilities associated with possible Turkish deployments and issued escalating warnings against Ankara.

Israeli policy therefore conflicts with that of an American NATO ally and with Washington’s declared objective of stabilising Syria.

The United States possesses instruments of pressure. It could condition weapons, intelligence, financing and diplomatic protection. The problem is that Trump appears politically unwilling or unable to employ them decisively.

Israel consequently enjoys the benefits of American sponsorship without accepting effective American direction. Its actions complicate Washington’s relations with Arab partners and Turkey, increase regional instability and obstruct America’s search for an exit from the Iran war.

The strategic inversion is stark. Israel helped drive the United States into the confrontation, moved into the background once the war became prolonged and costly, and retained the freedom to pursue policies elsewhere that undermine American objectives.

Washington is paying both for the war Israel helped initiate and for its inability to restrain the ally that promoted it.

9. The military and civilian bill is still rising

The direct damage to America’s regional military network is considerably greater than Washington initially acknowledged. Iranian missiles and drones struck at least 11 US bases across seven Middle Eastern countries, damaging runways, radar and surveillance systems, air-defence installations, ammunition facilities, command centres and residential infrastructure. The headquarters of the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain was among the sites that sustained serious damage.

Independent assessments have placed base-repair costs at approximately five billion dollars, excluding some destroyed weapons, aircraft, intelligence equipment and air-defence systems. Broader estimates have put the infrastructure damage as high as nine billion dollars. These remain provisional figures: the conflict continues, further attacks remain possible and no comprehensive Pentagon assessment has been published.

The disparity is even greater when the overall cost of the war is considered. The administration estimated that the first six days cost at least 11.3 billion dollars. By July, the Pentagon placed the total at 37.5 billion dollars while requesting a further 87.6 billion dollars from Congress, including more than 67 billion for Iran-related military operations and the replenishment of weapons and equipment. Trump has also proposed a 1.5-trillion-dollar defence budget for 2027, although that amount covers the entire military and cannot be attributed solely to Iran.

Independent assessments have been substantially higher than the official figures. One detailed estimate calculated that the first 60 days had cost approximately 72 billion dollars, including operations, expended munitions, damaged assets and support for Israel. Other American reporting has placed the continuing cost at close to one billion dollars a day. The difference arises partly because official statements have not always included the full cost of replacing advanced interceptors, repairing bases, repositioning forces and restoring depleted weapons stocks.

American households are paying separately. By late June, researchers estimated that consumers had already spent an additional 64 billion dollars on gasoline and diesel, equivalent to approximately 486 dollars per household. The burden has continued to grow. With the United States consuming around 374 million gallons of gasoline each day, every sustained increase of one dollar per gallon transfers roughly 374 million dollars a day from motorists, an annualised burden of more than 136 billion dollars. This calculation does not include higher food, transport, electricity and consumer-goods prices.

The final military and economic bill cannot yet be established because the war has neither ended nor been formally declared over.

10. The approaching electoral cost

The war may now become a defining issue in the November mid-term elections, when control of the House of Representatives and 35 Senate seats will be decided.

Trump’s approval rating has fallen to approximately 33 per cent, while support for the war has declined to around 31 per cent. Republican support has also weakened, indicating that opposition is no longer confined to Democrats. Most Americans now expect the conflict to continue, while gasoline prices and the broader cost of living remain among their principal concerns.

The political reversal is particularly damaging because Republicans used high fuel prices so effectively against the Biden administration. They must now defend prices exceeding four dollars a gallon during a war initiated by a Republican president who campaigned on promises to avoid foreign conflicts and reduce household costs.

Recent polling gives Democrats an eight-point advantage over Republicans on handling the cost of living. That does not determine the election outcome, but it places vulnerable Republican candidates in the difficult position of defending a costly war, rising prices and demands for additional military expenditure without being able to point to a clear victory or an agreed end to the conflict.

If the war continues into the campaign, the question facing Republican candidates will be straightforward: why should American voters bear higher prices, reduced domestic spending and an expanding military bill for objectives that Washington has repeatedly narrowed but still failed to achieve?

Conclusion

None of this means that Iran has won.

Iran has suffered devastating losses, and its population will bear the consequences long after the fighting stops. But wars are not judged only by determining which side suffered more destruction. They are judged by comparing the political outcome with the objectives and costs of those who chose to fight.

The United States entered the conflict speaking of regime change, control over Iran’s oil and the destruction of its nuclear and missile capabilities. It now seeks an exit centred on restoring maritime traffic and reducing energy prices.

This contraction of ambition coincides with mounting costs: damaged bases, depleted weapons stocks, tens of billions of dollars in military expenditure, higher household energy bills, declining presidential credibility, strained alliances and growing electoral danger for the Republican Party. Israel, which helped drive the confrontation, has meanwhile moved into the background while continuing to reject Washington’s regional plans.

These consequences will encourage other states to reduce their dependence on the United States. They do not need to replace Washington with another hegemon. They need only develop sufficient alternatives in trade, finance, defence, energy and diplomacy to protect themselves from American unpredictability.

The United States remains immensely powerful. But hegemony depends on more than the ability to punish. It requires other states to believe that American leadership is credible, predictable and preferable to the alternatives.

The United States has not lost its power to destroy. It has lost something more difficult to reconstruct: confidence that its power produces order, that its agreements can be trusted, that its alliances provide protection and that its leadership serves interests beyond its own immediate coercive demands.

That may prove to be the most enduring American loss of the war.