Lebanon after Hezbollah? The Sovereignty Gap in President Aoun’s Vision

By Elijah J. Magnier –

President Joseph Aoun has increasingly positioned himself as the advocate of a new Lebanese political vision: a sovereign state free from foreign interference, governed by a single authority, liberated from regional proxy conflicts, and capable of offering its citizens stability after decades of war. Few Lebanese would object to these aspirations. After years of economic collapse, political paralysis, regional confrontation and repeated wars, the promise of a normal state remains enormously attractive.

Yet beneath the appeal of this vision lies a series of contradictions that reveal the extraordinary difficulty of translating it into reality. Aoun’s speeches and public interventions identify many of Lebanon’s problems with considerable clarity. Hezbollah’s independent military structure, Iranian influence, foreign interference, the recurring devastation of war and the weakness of state institutions are all presented as obstacles to Lebanon’s recovery. What remains far less clear is how Lebanon intends to navigate beyond these realities without creating new vulnerabilities of its own. The central weakness in the current discourse is not the diagnosis. It is the absence of a convincing answer to a simple question: what comes after Hezbollah?

This question lies at the heart of every debate concerning Lebanon’s future. Aoun’s argument implicitly rests on the assumption that the dismantlement or marginalisation of Hezbollah’s military role would create conditions for a more stable and sovereign state. Yet the mechanisms through which such a transition would occur remain largely undefined.

The first contradiction emerges in the relationship between Hezbollah and deterrence. President Aoun frequently presents Hezbollah’s military autonomy as a source of instability that has repeatedly dragged Lebanon into unwanted confrontations. Many Lebanese share this view. Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria, its close relationship with Iran, and its military confrontation with Israel have undeniably imposed significant costs on Lebanon.

At the same time, however, Hezbollah has long served as Lebanon’s primary deterrent force against Israel. Whether that deterrent remains as effective after the 2023–2026 war is increasingly debated, but no alternative deterrence architecture has yet emerged. Supporters of the organisation argue that the relative stability of the Israeli-Lebanese border after 2006 was not produced by diplomacy, international guarantees or state institutions but by Hezbollah’s military capabilities. Whether one agrees with this interpretation or not, it cannot simply be dismissed.