Qui a promis la victoire en Iran ? Trump, ses généraux et les limites de la puissance militaire

Posted on by Elijah J Magnier
Graphic text reads: WHO PROMISED VICTORY IN IRAN? TRUMP, HIS GENERALS AND THE LIMITS OF MILITARY POWER. TRUMP’S RESPONSIBILITY: The objectives selected, intelligence discounted, and people appointed. Scrutinizing the military advice. WHAT WAS THE CAMPAIGN’S GOAL? Destroying military assets; preventing a nuclear weapon; compelling a negotiated concession; replacing a ruling establishment. THE DANGER: Destruction of targets becomes a substitute for a strategy. The graphic shows Donald Trump, a drone, smoke, and a mosque minaret.
A stylised editorial graphic examines Trump’s responsibility, military strategy, and the campaign’s goals in Iran.

Par Elijah J. Magnier

La responsabilité de Donald Trump dans la confrontation avec l’Iran commence avant la première frappe : avec les objectifs qu’il choisit, les renseignements qu’il écarte et les personnes qu’il nomme pour déterminer si la diplomatie a atteint ses limites. Mais la responsabilité présidentielle ne dispense pas d’examiner les conseils militaires sur lesquels reposent ses décisions. Qui a expliqué comment la puissance de feu américaine permettrait d’obtenir le résultat politique recherché par Washington ?

La question centrale est celle des objectifs assignés à la campagne. Détruire des moyens militaires, empêcher l’acquisition d’une arme nucléaire, imposer une concession négociée, empêcher le soutien aux alliés régionaux et remplacer le pouvoir en place sont des objectifs distincts. Chacun exige d’expliquer comment la force permettrait de l’atteindre. Sans cette distinction, la destruction de cibles et les assassinats ciblés peuvent tenir lieu de stratégie.

L’avertissement du renseignement et la décision présidentielle

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Published by Elijah J Magnier

Elijah J. Magnier is a veteran war correspondent and analyst specialising in military affairs, intelligence, strategic affairs and political risk. He has spent nearly four decades living and reporting inside countries at war, often from the front lines, while developing long-standing access to political leaders, military and intelligence officials, diplomats, armed non-state actors and communities directly affected by conflict. His field experience includes the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Iran–Iraq War, the Lebanese Civil War, the 1991 Gulf War, the wars in the former Yugoslavia, conflict in Sudan, the war in Afghanistan and Yemen, the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq and its aftermath, the 2006 Lebanon War, and the wars in Libya and Syria. He has lived for extended periods in Lebanon, Bosnia, Iraq, Iran, Libya and Syria, allowing him to follow conflicts, political transformations and regional networks beyond the limitations of short-term war reporting. His work focuses on warfare and deterrence, terrorism and counterterrorism, intelligence, political violence, armed non-state actors, regional security and the relationship between military power and political outcomes. He has also served as an adviser to the European Parliament’s Rapporteur on Iraq and Lebanon. Magnier holds a PhD in Policing and Criminal Justice from Liverpool John Moores University and an MSc in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of London. He has undertaken advanced studies in terrorism—including terrorist ideologies, financing and counterterrorism—at the University of St Andrews; terrorism and counterterrorism at Leiden University; and negotiation, including international and cross-cultural negotiation, at ESSEC Business School in Paris. His work combines sustained field access with academic analysis of war, sovereignty, deterrence and political violence.