Iraq’s Disarmament Dilemma: A Prime Minister’s Ambition Meets the Limits of Power

By Elijah J. Magnier

Iraq’s Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi wants to accomplish what his predecessors failed to achieve: dismantle the autonomy of powerful armed factions and establish the state as the sole authority entitled to exercise military force. His first major test is unfolding in Jurf al-Sakhr, south of Baghdad, where Kataib Hezbollah, an Iraqi non-state actor, has reportedly been ordered to withdraw by Friday, 20 November, at 8 p.m. Yet the prime minister’s ambition rests on a profound political and strategic contradiction. He seeks to disarm factions whose political allies were instrumental in bringing him to power, while demanding a state monopoly on force in a country whose government remains unable to prevent foreign aircraft from violating its airspace and bombing forces operating within its own security establishment. 

Al-Zaidi may enjoy considerable public support for his objective, but his political survival depends on a Shia coalition whose unity could fracture under the weight of his ambitions. Above all, he must reckon with the position of Grand Ayatollah Sayyed Ali al-Sistani, whose support for state authority cannot be interpreted as approval of an armed confrontation between Iraqis, whether Shia against Shia or Shia against Sunni.

Subscribe to get access

Read more of this content when you subscribe today.

American backing, however substantial, cannot resolve these domestic contradictions. Even President Donald Trump’s reported claim to have brought al-Zaidi to power would only sharpen the question of the prime minister’s political independence. Al-Zaidi cannot assume that Washington’s support gives him the authority, legitimacy or military capacity to confront powerful armed organisations that regard their weapons as indispensable while war continues along Iraq’s borders and the country itself remains exposed to the risk of being drawn into a wider regional confrontation. His greatest challenge, therefore, is not announcing the restoration of state sovereignty, but attempting to enforce it without triggering the very internal conflict that could destroy his government.

The dispute began with allegations of organised oil smuggling in Jurf al-Sakhr, renamed Jurf al-Nasr following its recapture from Islamic State in 2014. Government investigations identified suspected illegal refineries, storage facilities and pipeline manipulation. Nine officials have been dismissed, and judicial authorities are examining evidence of an operation allegedly responsible for diverting substantial quantities of state-owned petroleum. Kataib Hezbollah rejects the accusations, maintaining that the equipment served legitimate military purposes. Nevertheless, the investigation has provided al-Zaidi with a legal and political justification to challenge the faction’s longstanding control over an area from which federal authorities have exercised limited effective oversight but not to impose a military encirclement of the entire Jurf al-Sakhr area in preparation for an assault.

Oil theft in Iraq is neither new nor confined to Jurf al-Sakhr. For years, illicit petroleum networks have benefited from corruption, political protection, compromised security institutions and the fragmentation of authority between Baghdad and local power centres. Armed factions are part of this environment, but they are not its only beneficiaries. The significance of the current investigation lies in the prime minister’s decision to confront an entrenched security arrangement rather than restrict the inquiry to individual smugglers. His challenge is to demonstrate that the government intends to dismantle the mechanisms enabling such activities, including those within state institutions, rather than selectively punish a political adversary.

Al-Zaidi’s ambitions extend considerably beyond recovering stolen oil. At 41, and with American support for his security programme, he believes he has an opportunity to distinguish his premiership by asserting central authority over Iraq’s armed organisations. His government has adopted a disarmament agenda that could fundamentally alter the balance between the state and factions maintaining military structures outside effective governmental command. Resistance to this agenda is not confined to Kataib Hezbollah. Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, led by Akram al-Kaabi, is another influential Iraqi armed organisation opposed to relinquishing its weapons, regarding its military capabilities as essential to confronting external threats and preserving its role in Iraq’s security landscape. Yet al-Zaidi is not an anti-Iranian politician. He understands that no Iraqi prime minister can politically survive by openly declaring hostility towards either Iran or the United States. Both powers exercise considerable influence over Iraq’s political and security landscape, and antagonising either would expose his government to pressures it could struggle to withstand. His challenge is therefore to accommodate Washington’s demands without jeopardising relations with Tehran or provoking the powerful Iraqi factions whose political support remains essential to his survival.

The political obstacle is immediate. Al-Zaidi owes his appointment to the Coordination Framework, the Shia political alliance whose members include organisations closely connected to armed factions. His position consequently rests on a parliamentary majority that is not necessarily united behind his disarmament programme. Political support for a prime minister does not automatically translate into agreement with every decision he takes, particularly when those decisions threaten the military influence, institutional privileges or political survival of coalition partners. The same leaders who enabled al-Zaidi to govern can restrict his room for manoeuvre if they consider his actions a threat to their collective interests.

Al-Zaidi’s willingness to accommodate Washington extends beyond the disarmament question. His government has responded to American pressure to close seven of the nine official crossings with Iran, a demand associated with President Donald Trump’s Operation Economic Outcast, designed to intensify Tehran’s economic isolation. The prime minister ordered the closure of the al-Sheeb crossing in October, although it was subsequently reopened, while the broader American demand remains subject to negotiation. The approximately 1,600-kilometre Iraqi–Iranian frontier also contains unofficial crossing routes, making comprehensive economic isolation difficult to enforce. Tehran may nevertheless tolerate this cooperation with Washington, calculating that the Shia parliamentary majority and its political allies can limit any lasting damage to Iraqi–Iranian relations.

Nouri al-Maliki, Hadi al-Amiri and other senior Coordination Framework figures have intervened to seek an accommodation between the government and Kataib Hezbollah. Their involvement reflects a determination to prevent the dispute over Jurf al-Sakhr from destabilising the political arrangement sustaining al-Zaidi’s premiership. Although Kataib Hezbollah has warned against a forced entry, the consequences of fighting federal forces would extend beyond the organisation itself, potentially drawing its political allies into a confrontation none may be prepared to sustain.

The arrival in Baghdad of Esmail Qaani, commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, adds another dimension to the mediation. Tehran’s priority is to preserve its relationships with Iraqi Shia factions and prevent a confrontation that could weaken their collective military capabilities. Its involvement does not necessarily imply opposition to revised security arrangements in Jurf al-Sakhr, provided these preserve capabilities Iran regards as strategically essential.

That calculation cannot be separated from the broader regional confrontation. The US–Israeli war against Iran has subsided from its most intensive phase, but the underlying confrontation remains unresolved. A further escalation cannot be excluded, even if neither side presently seeks another prolonged conflict. Iraqi armed factions have become part of a regional military environment linking Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Ansar Allah in Yemen. Their relationships are not identical, nor do they constitute a unified command structure, but their capacity to intervene across interconnected theatres has acquired strategic importance during periods of confrontation.

Iraq’s security predicament is compounded by the absence of an effective mechanism through which Baghdad can independently enforce restrictions on foreign military operations involving its territory. Diplomatic protests and formal declarations of sovereignty do not provide the surveillance capabilities, air-defence systems or operational independence necessary to prevent unauthorised military activity. This exposes a structural weakness in the government’s security programme: domestic armed organisations are being asked to surrender capabilities to national institutions whose ability to protect the country against external threats remains contested. The question is not whether these organisations possess a legitimate entitlement to independent military action, but whether the government can provide a credible alternative security framework.

Al-Zaidi’s approach to Kurdistan reveals another dimension of his strategy. Baghdad has longstanding disputes with the Kurdistan Regional Government over oil exports, revenue transfers and the extent of federal authority. Iraqi political and security circles have also repeatedly Israeli intelligence (Mossad) activity in the region. The prime minister can argue that establishing the rule of law in Jurf al-Sakhr strengthens his position when demanding compliance elsewhere. He would face accusations of selective enforcement if he challenged Kurdish autonomy and oil arrangements while leaving comparable violations by Shia factions untouched.

The most plausible solution is consequently neither the immediate disarmament of Kataib Hezbollah nor a military assault on its positions. A negotiated withdrawal, followed by the deployment of Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) units alongside the Federal Police, offers a way to reconcile the competing demands. Discussions have already examined such arrangements, including transferring responsibility for oil installations and deploying PMF formations linked to the religious authorities in Najaf. Their involvement could provide a solution acceptable to Baghdad without compelling Kataib Hezbollah to surrender its entire military structure.

The PMF’s institutional position makes this compromise particularly significant. Established as a formal component of Iraq’s security apparatus under Law No. 40 of 2016, the Hashd al-Shaabi falls under the authority of the prime minister as commander-in-chief. It is therefore a state force, not an outside militia being introduced to replace another militia. At the same time, its constituent formations have extensive political, personal and historical relationships with armed organisations. This combination of legal state authority and familiarity with the factions allows the PMF to perform a role that other federal forces might find considerably more difficult. The Popular Mobilisation Forces are not exclusively Shia. Their structures have also incorporated Sunni, Christian, Shabak and Yazidi formations.

The political consequences of Friday’s deadline may extend well beyond Jurf al-Sakhr. A negotiated settlement could establish a precedent for bringing other armed factions into arrangements with the state without compelling them to surrender their weapons, while an agreement that leaves existing power structures untouched could reinforce their resistance to future disarmament initiatives. Al-Zaidi therefore, has little room for a military confrontation and every reason to seek a face-saving, mutually acceptable compromise. Such an outcome would allow him to demonstrate the presence and authority of official security forces in Jurf al-Sakhr without dismantling Kataib Hezbollah’s military capabilities or eliminating its presence in the area.

This would resemble his approach last September, when an ultimatum to disarm two non-state armed organisations was effectively deferred for another year. The prime minister could consequently present a negotiated deployment as an assertion of state authority, while the factions would retain the capabilities they consider indispensable. The real test of al-Zaidi’s political judgement will be whether he can transform an ultimatum he cannot afford to enforce militarily into an agreement that allows every party to claim a victory without fundamentally altering the existing balance of power.

Advertisements
Advertisements
Advertisements