
By Elijah J. Magnier
Israel targeted Hezbollah’s communications systems and strategic missile capabilities, killing its secretary-general and a large number of the Jihad Council commanders who oversaw all military units. This was a significant blow, but far from decisive enough to determine the outcome of the ground invasion. This strategic miscalculation was precisely Israel’s mistake in deciding to invade Lebanon. Indeed, had any other state or non-state military organisation faced such extensive sabotage, the assassination of its top leadership and a relentless air campaign aimed at destroying many of its surface weapons depots, it would probably have descended into protracted chaos. However, despite these significant setbacks, Israel underestimated the distinct operational role and resilience of Hezbollah’s military and special forces in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley units.
These forces, deeply committed to defending the abandoned Palestinian people, southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley, remained far from collapse and suffered little to no significant damage. For more than two weeks, Israel, backed by its air force, artillery and drones, has been battling the first line of Hezbollah special forces. Israeli forces have been slowly advancing into Lebanese territory, but have not yet encountered Hezbollah’s main line of defence, where the bulk of its forces are stationed.
Hezbollah’s strength lies in the strategic organisation of its fighters, which is compartmentalised, allowing military units to operate independently of the main command and control centre in Beirut. The Southern Command, which directs the war against the Israeli invasion, remains fully intact and unharmed by Israeli strikes. Key planners from central and branch command centres had relocated as a precautionary measure after the first wave of Israeli air strikes, ensuring the continued operation of Hezbollah’s military structure.
Although the Israeli strikes were likely based on intelligence about the locations of Hezbollah’s offices and weapons depots, Hezbollah’s asymmetric capabilities allowed it to regroup quickly. This allowed its Shura Council to appoint the new Military Jihad Council and re-establish communication with the southern command centres directing the ongoing battle. This organisational resilience ensured that Hezbollah’s leadership and operational framework remained intact, allowing it to continue its fight effectively.
In Sheikh Naim Qassem’s first appearance since the recent events, Hezbollah’s deputy secretary-general appeared shaken, visibly sweating and seemingly struggling to project authority. His message to the Lebanese people, especially Hezbollah’s supporters, was clear: despite his role in overseeing the party’s ministers and parliamentarians rather than the military, some form of leadership remained intact and he was now speaking on their behalf. The shock was understandable, given the circumstances. Hezbollah had just suffered the sabotage of its communications system, resulting in more than 3,000 casualties. In addition, a devastating two-week period saw the destruction of ammunition depots and the assassination of key leaders, including the highly respected and charismatic Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah.
In his second public appearance, Sheikh Qassem appeared to regain his …
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