Why the U.S. Only Wants Hezbollah’s Precision Weapons, Not Its Full Disarmament

By Elijah J. Magnier –

The United States does not seek the total disarmament of Hezbollah. It wants something far more specific—and strategic. The American objective is the removal of Hezbollah’s precision-guided missiles and drones, the weapons that pose a direct and credible threat to Israel’s military and civilian infrastructure. This is not about neutralising Hezbollah as a whole, but about selectively dismantling the only part of its arsenal that can shift the regional balance of power.

This policy is not new, but it has grown more overt as regional tensions intensify. The latest diplomatic push, led by US envoy Thomas Barak—currently Ambassador to Turkey and Washington’s unofficial liaison for Lebanon and Syria—has centred on exerting pressure on Lebanese officials to curtail and eventually dismantle Hezbollah’s military capabilities. In an exceptionally provocative move, Barak warned not only of the risk of a renewed civil war in Lebanon, but also floated the notion of folding Lebanon into a broader regional entity—”Bilad al-Sham,” or Greater Syria. For many observers, this was less a cautionary note and more a thinly veiled political threat, signalling Washington’s willingness to exploit Lebanon’s fragility if its demands are not met.

The United States does not want chaos in Lebanon, but it is willing to tolerate instability if it results in Hezbollah’s strategic weakening. The drones and precision missiles are the red line. These weapons are the only ones that can reach deep into Israeli territory, bypass missile defence systems, and shift the cost of confrontation. Removing them would not neutralise Hezbollah entirely, but it would effectively disarm its deterrence capacity.

While diplomatic negotiations continue, a more volatile and alarming narrative is taking shape within Lebanon’s domestic arena. Samir Geagea, leader of the Lebanese Forces (LF) and a long-standing ally of the United States, has increasingly adopted militarised rhetoric. Over recent months, both Geagea and senior LF officials have spoken openly—and deliberately—about the party’s military readiness. Ibrahim El-Sakr, a prominent LF figure, declared that “15,000 fighters” are already positioned in Zahle and Deir Al-Ahmar, and went further, claiming the party could mobilise up to “50,000 fighters if necessary.” However, he added the familiar refrain: “God forbid.” Just this July, MP Pierre Bou Assi reaffirmed the message, stating, “More than 15,000 Lebanese Forces members are proudly ready to defend Lebanon in the event of a state collapse.” These remarks are not offhand—they are calibrated signals meant to project power, shape public perception, and position the Lebanese Forces as the dominant Christian militia prepared to step into the vacuum if national institutions falter. These statements are not accidental.