Israel’s Intelligence Service Mossad: The Myth of “Long Arms” and the Reality of Failure

Israel’s Intelligence Service Mossad: The Myth of “Long Arms” and the Reality of Failure

By Elijah J. Magnier –

Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has vowed to “hunt down” Hamas leaders wherever they may be, warning that “their lives will be short if a single hair of the Israeli hostages in Gaza City is harmed.” At the same time, Israel is bombarding the city of one million inhabitants in preparation for a ground invasion, forcing hundreds of thousands to flee. Yet Hamas and other Palestinian groups have made clear they will not abandon their positions. The eight or so hostages trapped in Gaza are therefore unlikely to survive the Israeli advance, which requires the destruction of entire neighbourhoods. In effect, Netanyahu and Israeli society know that the invasion amounts to a death sentence for the captives. Anticipating this, Netanyahu is already shifting responsibility: each time Hamas announces the death of a hostage, he frames it as a trigger for vengeance, promising to eliminate Hamas leaders and boasting of Mossad’s “long arm.” In fact, Mossad’s long arm, so often celebrated, is less a mark of strength than a measure of how far others are willing to let Israel go.

By invoking Mossad’s “long arm” in this way, Netanyahu draws on a carefully constructed legend. For decades, Israel’s intelligence service has cultivated a fearsome image: a clandestine organisation able to strike anywhere in the world. Yet that reputation owes less to flawless operations than to the shield of impunity it enjoys. Mossad benefits from the protection of powerful Western governments, which rush to its defence whenever its agents are exposed. It operates with forged identities and the most advanced technologies, often acquired through allied research programmes, partner intelligence services, and multinational corporations. When its operations fail—as they often do—the damage is contained not by competence but by politics. Mossad’s legend endures not because of its record, but because its patrons ensure the costs of failure are never paid.

The mythology of Mossad is sustained by films, novels, and carefully planted leaks. Stories of daring missions, spectacular assassinations, and deep-cover spies circulate freely. Israel encourages this aura because it deters adversaries and impresses allies. Yet a closer look reveals a litany of failed operations, botched assassinations, and bungled plots that exposed Mossad agents and embarrassed their backers. The truth is simple: Mossad’s reach is long only because the runway is cleared for it. Israel is gifted immunity when caught red-handed. Passports can be forged because friendly countries look away. Arrested agents are quietly returned home after diplomatic pressure. Advanced surveillance systems and cyber-weapons are available because Western research institutions open their doors. Without this protective shield, Mossad’s record would look less like mastery and more like recklessness.

One of Mossad’s most humiliating failures unfolded in Jordan in September 1997. Agents attempted to assassinate Khaled Meshal, a senior Hamas leader, by spraying a slow-acting poison into his ear as he walked in Amman. The plot collapsed almost instantly. Meshal’s bodyguards chased down and captured two Mossad operatives, while four others fled to the Israeli embassy. King Hussein was enraged at the violation of Jordan’s sovereignty and placed the peace treaty with Israel on the line. He told the Americans bluntly: “If Meshal dies, the peace treaty dies with him.” U.S. President Bill Clinton intervened personally, forcing Israel to hand over the antidote to save Meshal’s life. Netanyahu’s government, humiliated, was forced to release Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Hamas’s spiritual leader, along with around 70 other prisoners, in exchange for the captured agents. Instead of weakening Hamas, the operation revived it. Instead of projecting strength, Mossad revealed incompetence and forced its closest ally to clean up the mess.

A similar debacle struck in Dubai in January 2010, when Hamas official Mahmoud al-Mabhouh was found dead in his hotel room. The assassination bore Mossad’s fingerprints: covert surveillance, coordinated entries and exits, and a fatal injection. Yet Dubai’s security services quickly exposed the entire operation. CCTV footage showed suspects moving awkwardly through lobbies, their wigs slipping, disguises comical. Dubai police identified 26 suspects linked to the killing, most travelling under forged passports. The scandal widened when it was revealed that Mossad had cloned documents from friendly Western states: twelve British, six Irish, four French, four Australian, and one German passport. The revelation outraged governments whose citizens’ identities had been hijacked. Dubai police chief Dhahi Khalfan accused Israel of “abusing the passports of nations who consider themselves friends of Israel.” London expelled an Israeli diplomat; Ireland and Australia each expelled senior Mossad representatives, including the agency’s station chief in Canberra. Yet the consequences ended there. Within months, relations were quietly restored. Mossad’s agents returned home, its leadership unscathed, and its methods unchanged. The lesson was clear: Israel could compromise the security of its allies’ citizens with little lasting penalty.

The use of foreign passports has been a cornerstone of Mossad tradecraft. Israeli operatives routinely travel on stolen or forged identities from Europe, North America, and Australasia. This gives them access where Israeli documents would raise suspicion, and ensures that if they are caught, diplomatic pressure from the forged nationality’s government will intervene. Mossad’s reach has always relied on others’ passports and others’ silence.

But this reliance has also led to fiascos. In 2004, two Mossad agents, Uriel Kelman and Eli Cara, were arrested in New Zealand after attempting to fraudulently obtain passports under the names of disabled citizens. Prime Minister Helen Clark was furious, describing the incident as “an act of state-backed criminality.” The two were sentenced to six months in prison before being deported. Diplomatic relations froze, and Israel issued a rare apology. Yet, as in Dubai, the consequences were temporary. New Zealand resumed ties, and Mossad continued to use Western identities to cover its operations.

The list of failures stretches further back. In 1973, in Lillehammer, Norway, Mossad agents killed Ahmed Bouchiki, a Moroccan waiter they mistakenly believed was Ali Hassan Salameh of Black September, responsible for the Munich Olympics attack. Six agents were arrested, tried, and convicted. Norwegian Prime Minister Trygve Bratteli called it “an appalling violation of our sovereignty and of the rule of law.” Yet the convicted operatives served minimal time—most were released within 22 months. Again, the agents went home, and Israel’s allies ensured the damage did not last.

In 1998, Swiss authorities caught Mossad agents wiretapping what it was claimed to be a Hezbollah office in Berne. The agents were arrested, the scandal splashed across Swiss media, and Israel’s foreign minister, Ariel Sharon, was dispatched to apologise. Once again, exposure led to temporary embarrassment but no meaningful cost. Mossad could continue operating in Europe knowing its mistakes would be forgiven.

The so-called “pager attack” on Hezbollah was hailed in Israel as a masterstroke of intelligence and technical creativity. Thousands of communication devices, used by Hezbollah fighters and operatives, were rigged with small explosive charges and smuggled into Lebanon disguised as ordinary imports. Yet such an operation cannot be explained by Israeli cunning alone. Moving entire shipments of booby-trapped equipment across continents and through multiple ports would be impossible without complicity, or at least deliberate blindness, from other states. Every port has scanners, detection systems, and customs officers trained to identify explosives. How then could crates of thousands of lethal devices move from Asia to Turkey, and from there to Lebanon, without interception? The answer lies in the exceptional protection Israel enjoys from Western governments and allied intelligence networks.

The illusion of Mossad’s brilliance collapses when examining the logistics. The final shipment was exposed in a Turkish harbour when Hezbollah informed the Turks, who confirmed the presence of explosives and contained the risk. Israel was not punished for smuggling via Turkey explosives to another country, violating multiple layers of international and domestic law^[1]. If Israel were relying solely on its own tradecraft, the odds of detection at one of the many transit points would have been overwhelming. Instead, the shipments were waved through, protected by the invisible hand of allies who ensured they travelled uninspected and Israel was unaccountable for its act.

The attack’s temporary success owed less to Mossad’s genius than to the infrastructure of impunity surrounding Israel. Intelligence sharing with the United States and European partners provided cover stories and flagged containers to be “cleared without inspection.” Shipping companies, many operating under Western flags, turned a blind eye. Port authorities in Asia and the Mediterranean followed signals not to interfere. When the devices finally reached Lebanon, the attack was celebrated in Tel Aviv as a demonstration of reach and creativity. But in truth it was proof of privilege: Mossad does not move through the world undetected because it is invisible, but because others provide the cloak.

This pattern is not new. In the 1960s, Israel built its secret nuclear arsenal by exploiting the same network of indulgence and protection. In 1968, the freighter Scheersberg A, carrying 200 tons of yellowcake uranium from Antwerp, “disappeared” on route to Italy before resurfacing empty — the cargo believed to have been diverted to Israel’s Dimona reactor (Cohen, 1998; Hersh, 1991). Western intelligence agencies knew but looked away. French and American research laboratories provided critical technologies, while German and Norwegian companies were later exposed as suppliers of heavy water and precision equipment. Each transaction could have been blocked by allies applying the rules of non-proliferation. Instead, Israel was shielded, allowing it to acquire a nuclear arsenal outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The parallels with the pager attack are striking: logistical feats possible only because powerful states ensured safe passage.

The most recent debacle came in 2025, when Israel struck Doha, the capital of Qatar, killing five people, including a Qatari and four Palestinians. Netanyahu, in a departure from Israel’s traditional policy of denial, claimed responsibility openly. The strike was not only a violation of a sovereign state but also an assault on mediation itself. Qatar, host of the largest U.S. military base in the region, found itself attacked by a state that Washington shields at every turn. For Mossad, which had provided the intelligence for the strike, the fallout was another example of excess. The result was diplomatic outrage, condemnation from across the Arab world, and yet again the certainty that no real penalty would follow.

Mossad’s reputation for long arms rests not on infallibility but on political protection. Its failures are absorbed by governments that prefer not to confront Israel. When agents are caught, they are released. When operations go wrong, apologies are enough. The mythology persists because powerful states collude in sustaining it.

This collusion extends beyond diplomacy to technology. Mossad enjoys privileged access to Western surveillance, cyber capabilities, and research networks. The Stuxnet virus, used to sabotage Iran’s nuclear programme, was developed jointly with U.S. agencies. Israeli hackers benefit from information-sharing with the NSA and CIA, while intelligence from SIS (MI6) and other European services flows routinely into Tel Aviv. Mossad’s agents carry equipment developed in Silicon Valley labs, German and other European research institutes, and British universities. Israeli drones cross borders because air defences are ordered not to respond. Mossad can penetrate financial systems because Western governments quietly open the databases. Its long arms are enabled by borrowed hands.

Yet this dependence also reveals fragility. Without the indulgence of allies, Mossad’s operations would be crippled. A Russian or Iranian blunder on the scale of Dubai or Amman would have led to sanctions, trials, and worldwide condemnation. Mossad emerges from its failures because Washington, London, and Canberra rescue it. The asymmetry encourages recklessness. Israeli operatives behave as though rules do not apply because, in practice, they do not.

Behind the mythology lies a culture of carelessness. Mossad has long arms only because others clear the path. Its immunity is its greatest asset. Without it, the agency would be remembered less for daring exploits and more for reckless blunders that endangered allies and undermined diplomacy. In reality, Mossad’s legend rests not on mastery of the shadows but on the willingness of powerful nations to look away. 

Footnote:

^[1] United Nations (1982) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397. Relevant provisions: Article 27 (criminal jurisdiction over foreign ships in territorial seas), Article 94 (flag state duties), Article 108 (suppression of illicit traffic in narcotics as precedent for illicit cargo control). Available at: https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf (Accessed: 17 September 2025).

International Maritime Organization (1988) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention), 10 March 1988, 1678 UNTS 221. Relevant provisions: Article 3(1)(f) criminalises the transport or placement of “any device or substance likely to destroy or damage a ship or cargo” with intent to cause death, injury, or damage.
Available at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2005/04/20050428%2006-13%20AM/Ch_XII_16p.pdf(Accessed: 17 September 2025).

United Nations (1997) International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 15 December 1997, 2149 UNTS 256. Relevant provisions: Article 2 defines unlawful and intentional delivery, placement, or detonation of explosives in public or government facilities, including transport contexts. Available at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/english-18-9.pdf (Accessed: 17 September 2025).

United Nations Security Council (2001) Resolution 1373 (2001), S/RES/1373 (28 September 2001). Relevant provisions: Paragraphs 1(b)–(d) obligate all states to prevent and suppress financing, movement, and supply of weapons or explosives to non-state actors.
Available at: https://undocs.org/S/RES/1373(2001) (Accessed: 17 September 2025).

United Nations Security Council (2004) Resolution 1540 (2004), S/RES/1540 (28 April 2004). Relevant provisions: Paragraphs 2–3 require all states to prevent proliferation of WMD, explosives, and related materials through “effective border controls and law enforcement to detect, deter, prevent and combat… illicit trafficking.”
Available at: https://undocs.org/S/RES/1540(2004) (Accessed: 17 September 2025).

World Customs Organization (2007) SAFE Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade (as updated). Brussels: WCO. Relevant provisions: Pillar I, Standard 1 and 3 establish obligations for customs administrations to screen and interdict high-risk cargo, including explosives, across all supply chains. Available at: https://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/facilitation/instrument-and-tools/tools/safe_package.aspx(Accessed: 17 September 2025).

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^[1] United Nations (1982) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397. Relevant provisions: Article 27 (criminal jurisdiction over foreign ships in territorial seas), Article 94 (flag state duties), Article 108 (suppression of illicit traffic in narcotics as precedent for illicit cargo control). Available at: https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf (Accessed: 17 September 2025).

International Maritime Organization (1988) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention), 10 March 1988, 1678 UNTS 221. Relevant provisions: Article 3(1)(f) criminalises the transport or placement of “any device or substance likely to destroy or damage a ship or cargo” with intent to cause death, injury, or damage.
Available at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2005/04/20050428%2006-13%20AM/Ch_XII_16p.pdf(Accessed: 17 September 2025).

United Nations (1997) International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 15 December 1997, 2149 UNTS 256. Relevant provisions: Article 2 defines unlawful and intentional delivery, placement, or detonation of explosives in public or government facilities, including transport contexts. Available at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/english-18-9.pdf (Accessed: 17 September 2025).

United Nations Security Council (2001) Resolution 1373 (2001), S/RES/1373 (28 September 2001). Relevant provisions: Paragraphs 1(b)–(d) obligate all states to prevent and suppress financing, movement, and supply of weapons or explosives to non-state actors.
Available at: https://undocs.org/S/RES/1373(2001) (Accessed: 17 September 2025).

United Nations Security Council (2004) Resolution 1540 (2004), S/RES/1540 (28 April 2004). Relevant provisions: Paragraphs 2–3 require all states to prevent proliferation of WMD, explosives, and related materials through “effective border controls and law enforcement to detect, deter, prevent and combat… illicit trafficking.”
Available at: https://undocs.org/S/RES/1540(2004) (Accessed: 17 September 2025).

World Customs Organization (2007) SAFE Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade (as updated). Brussels: WCO. Relevant provisions: Pillar I, Standard 1 and 3 establish obligations for customs administrations to screen and interdict high-risk cargo, including explosives, across all supply chains. Available at: https://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/facilitation/instrument-and-tools/tools/safe_package.aspx(Accessed: 17 September 2025).