Israel enlarges its targets in Lebanon and invites Hezbollah to strike Tel Aviv in the event of all-out war

By Elijah J. Magnier

In recent weeks Israel has stepped up its rhetoric toward Hezbollah and Lebanon, framing its narrative around the claim that “Hezbollah is rearming and must be neutralised” and asserting that the Lebanese government and army will present a plan to disarm the movement before the end of 2025. US envoy Thomas Barrack gave Lebanon until the end of this month of November to come up with a plan to disarm Hezbollah and establish direct dialogue with Israel. Nowhere in these statements is there reference to Israel’s thousands of ceasefire violations, its continued occupation of newly improvised hills since the October 2024 war, or the hundreds of Lebanese killed daily since that conflict. Washington and Tel Aviv no longer invoke UNSCR 1701, which ended the 2024 hostilities; instead, they focus on what Lebanon can deliver for Israel’s security by eliminating the resistance’s military capacity — without offering reciprocal concessions from Israeli occupying forces.

Israel’s defence minister, Israel Katz, warned that “any attack on the Israeli northern settlements will trigger an immediate attack on the capital, Beirut.” Taken literally, this amounts to an invitation: if Israel treats strikes on its northern settlements as justification to hit Beirut, Hezbollah is effectively encouraged to expand its response beyond tactical retaliation and target Israel’s political and economic centres from the first day of an all-out war.

Operationally, Israel’s targeting has widened. Where strikes once focused on active combatants of the Jihadi body. Recent operations have extended to Hezbollah members defined by “geography forces” (permanent residents of southern Lebanon). Israel has also initiated targeting Hezbollah members of the “executive branch” holding municipal or administrative roles, and, most strikingly, those wounded or disabled in the pre-war “pager sabotage” attacks. Hitting people clearly out of combat cannot plausibly be framed as proportional retaliation; it represents a calibrated rule of engagement designed to apply pressure without crossing the threshold into generalised war and to send a message that Israel is making no distinction between Hezbollah branches. For Hezbollah, this shift comes as the movement concentrates on reconstruction: it has spent over $1 billion repairing roughly 70 per cent of damaged buildings in southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and Beirut’s suburbs — work that Israel is totally obstructing in Lebanese border villages, preventing displaced residents from repairing their homes and returning.