Lebanon’s Year of Concessions: How Diplomacy Failed and Became a One-Way Street

By Elijah J. Magnier –

It is in Israel’s strategic interest to see Lebanon internally divided, especially as it has become clear that Hezbollah cannot be disarmed through a military air campaign alone and that Lebanese diplomacy has failed to assume its responsibility to defend Lebanon’s sovereignty or halt Israel’s daily bombing. Fragmentation inside Lebanon weakens any unified political stance, erodes national deterrence, and allows Israel to operate in an environment where the state is unable to articulate or enforce a coherent defence policy.

Israel, however, is not in a position to reoccupy Lebanon. It lacks both the military capacity and the political tolerance for the kind of sustained ground campaign such an operation would require. Its 2024 attempt demonstrated this clearly. Once Israeli ground forces pushed into southern Lebanon, they faced organised and ideologically committed resistance that held firm against tens of thousands of attacking troops. The Lebanese national army, never equipped for this role, was unable to assume such responsibility, while Lebanese diplomacy proved largely powerless to shape the outcome. Hezbollah’s defensive performance, rather than state institutions, prevented a deeper and longer occupation. The resistance continues to protect Lebanon from the loss of large territories and retains the capacity to engage a vastly superior enemy, even if it is not its equal. Notably, Israel managed to occupy five high-ground hills only after the ceasefire, not during the war, when its forces avoided spending a single night on occupied Lebanese territory for fear of night ambushes.

In this context, maintaining Lebanon’s political paralysis becomes an indirect tool for Israel. If the state cannot consolidate authority, negotiate from a position of strength, or coordinate national defence, Hezbollah remains the sole effective deterrent actor—something Israel denounces publicly while exploiting it in practice. A divided Lebanon is easier to pressure and destabilise, and far easier to manage than a cohesive state capable of defining and enforcing clear red lines.