Can China End the Ukraine War—or Does Beijing Prefer It to Continue More Slowly?

Posted on by Elijah J Magnier
Text reads “CAN CHINA END THE UKRAINE WAR—OR DOES BEIJING PREFER IT TO LET IT TO CONTINUE MORE SLOWLY?” beside a colorful Chinese dragon, maps, and war-torn scenes.
A vivid editorial illustration asks whether China can end the Ukraine war or prefers a slower conflict.

By Elijah J. Magnier

China possesses more influence over Russia than any other major power still maintaining a close relationship with Moscow. It is Russia’s largest energy customer, an indispensable supplier of manufactured and dual-use goods, a critical diplomatic partner and an increasingly important channel to the non-Western financial system. Chinese President Xi Jinping can consequently speak to Vladimir Putin with an authority unavailable to European leaders.

This does not mean that Beijing can order Moscow to end the war. Nor does it make China a neutral mediator standing at equal distance from Russia and Ukraine. China has not joined Western sanctions, has given Russia diplomatic cover and has provided the economic relationship that helped Moscow withstand its separation from European markets. Beijing repeatedly calls for negotiations and opposes nuclear escalation, but it has avoided exerting the level of pressure that could place Russia in danger of strategic defeat.

China can play a role in ending the war—but only if the emerging settlement protects its own interests and takes onboard Russia’s national security. Until then, Beijing may consider a slower and contained conflict preferable both to Russia’s defeat and to an uncontrolled Russian victory.

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Published by Elijah J Magnier

Elijah J. Magnier is a veteran war correspondent and analyst specialising in military affairs, intelligence, strategic affairs and political risk. He has spent nearly four decades living and reporting inside countries at war, often from the front lines, while developing long-standing access to political leaders, military and intelligence officials, diplomats, armed non-state actors and communities directly affected by conflict. His field experience includes the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Iran–Iraq War, the Lebanese Civil War, the 1991 Gulf War, the wars in the former Yugoslavia, conflict in Sudan, the war in Afghanistan and Yemen, the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq and its aftermath, the 2006 Lebanon War, and the wars in Libya and Syria. He has lived for extended periods in Lebanon, Bosnia, Iraq, Iran, Libya and Syria, allowing him to follow conflicts, political transformations and regional networks beyond the limitations of short-term war reporting. His work focuses on warfare and deterrence, terrorism and counterterrorism, intelligence, political violence, armed non-state actors, regional security and the relationship between military power and political outcomes. He has also served as an adviser to the European Parliament’s Rapporteur on Iraq and Lebanon. Magnier holds a PhD in Policing and Criminal Justice from Liverpool John Moores University and an MSc in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of London. He has undertaken advanced studies in terrorism—including terrorist ideologies, financing and counterterrorism—at the University of St Andrews; terrorism and counterterrorism at Leiden University; and negotiation, including international and cross-cultural negotiation, at ESSEC Business School in Paris. His work combines sustained field access with academic analysis of war, sovereignty, deterrence and political violence.