La stratégie iranienne à Ormuz : alourdir le coût de la guerre de Trump avant le scrutin américain

Posted on by Elijah J Magnier
Protesters hold war and oil price signs beside tankers at sea
Protesters raise signs about war, oil prices, and the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz.

Par Elijah J. Magnier

Les attaques contre la navigation commerciale dans le détroit d’Ormuz et ses environs mettent au jour une vulnérabilité que la supériorité militaire américaine ne peut aisément résoudre : l’écart entre infliger des dommages à l’Iran et obtenir un résultat économiquement supportable et politiquement durable. Pour Donald Trump, l’approche des élections au Congrès accentue cette distinction. Un président qui a fait campagne sur la fin des guerres et la baisse des prix se trouve confronté à un conflit dans lequel la persistance de l’insécurité maritime menace ces deux promesses.

Les éléments disponibles suffisent à montrer que Téhéran exploite délibérément ce moment et provoque Trump pour l’entraîner dans une nouvelle confrontation. De hauts responsables iraniens reconnaissent que les changements dans la fréquence et les méthodes des attaques contre les pétroliers et les autres navires visent, en partie, à influencer les élections américaines en empêchant la baisse des cours du pétrole et, en partie, à démontrer l’absence de maîtrise américaine de la sécurité de la navigation dans le détroit d’Ormuz.

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Published by Elijah J Magnier

Elijah J. Magnier is a veteran war correspondent and analyst specialising in military affairs, intelligence, strategic affairs and political risk. He has spent nearly four decades living and reporting inside countries at war, often from the front lines, while developing long-standing access to political leaders, military and intelligence officials, diplomats, armed non-state actors and communities directly affected by conflict. His field experience includes the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Iran–Iraq War, the Lebanese Civil War, the 1991 Gulf War, the wars in the former Yugoslavia, conflict in Sudan, the war in Afghanistan and Yemen, the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq and its aftermath, the 2006 Lebanon War, and the wars in Libya and Syria. He has lived for extended periods in Lebanon, Bosnia, Iraq, Iran, Libya and Syria, allowing him to follow conflicts, political transformations and regional networks beyond the limitations of short-term war reporting. His work focuses on warfare and deterrence, terrorism and counterterrorism, intelligence, political violence, armed non-state actors, regional security and the relationship between military power and political outcomes. He has also served as an adviser to the European Parliament’s Rapporteur on Iraq and Lebanon. Magnier holds a PhD in Policing and Criminal Justice from Liverpool John Moores University and an MSc in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of London. He has undertaken advanced studies in terrorism—including terrorist ideologies, financing and counterterrorism—at the University of St Andrews; terrorism and counterterrorism at Leiden University; and negotiation, including international and cross-cultural negotiation, at ESSEC Business School in Paris. His work combines sustained field access with academic analysis of war, sovereignty, deterrence and political violence.